Introduction
In this article, I examine how new or newly recognised social needs and demands translate into policy change in Christian Democratic welfare states. New social demands result from the shift away from the industrial society, which was based on standard industrial employment, stable family structures and the social insurance of male breadwinners.
Demands for new, modernising social policies such as child care infrastructure and social protection of parenthood and atypical employment rank increasingly high on the reform agendas of these welfare states. In this article, I ask whether the political conflict lines in these "new" social policy reforms differ from those observed on "old" issues. In other words, I ask whether the new social policies are supported by particular "new" alliances of actors.
As I will show below, there are theoretical arguments, which suggest such a change, notably the increasing emergence of social-liberal value alliances, and of alliances between labour and capital for reforms enabling labour market participation. Moreover, I argue that the reconfiguration of alliances in the policy process is mediated by the national institutional framework of decision-making, so that the chances for "new", modernising coalitions are higher in consensus democracies than in majoritarian systems.
Such reconfigurations of actor alliances have been identified in various case studies. Crossclass coalitions of employers, liberals and the left on modernising social policies occurred in reforms on child care infrastructure and occupational pensions for part-time workers (see Ballestri and Bonoli 2003 , Daguerre 2003 , Häusermann 2002 , Kübler and Papadopoulos 2003 . Value coalitions between Social Democrats and liberal parties on gender equality policies have been observed in reforms of old age and maternity insurance (see Meyer 1998 , Häusermann et al. 2004 , Martin 2002 ). Yet, while providing detailed analyses of specific reform processes, these case studies often lack a comprehensive theoretical framework explaining whether these new coalitions represent mere exceptions, a certain blurring of traditional coalitions without new patterns being established, or a new trend towards a profound restructuring of conflict lines in the field of social policy. This article aims at providing a theoretical framework and suggests a systematic analytical strategy for the analysis of the politics of new social needs and demands.
The hypotheses on changing reform coalitions are tested empirically on the basis of four pension and family policy reforms in Switzerland and Germany. These policies are affected by the emergence of new social needs and demands, while being under a parallel pressure for retrenchment. Hence they allow the comparison of the politics of "old" as compared to "new" social policy issues. Germany and Switzerland fit in a "most similar system design" strategy of comparison. Indeed, while it is true that Switzerland has a rather liberal labour market regime, both countries belong to the model of employment-related and highly stratifying Christian Democratic welfare states with regard to pension and family policy. In these welfare regimes, policies directed at new social needs and demands are particularly underdeveloped (Bonoli 2004) . The two countries differ, however, to a certain extent with respect to the institutional framework of decision-making. In Switzerland, all major parties are represented in the oversized coalition-government. While this -as well as the threat of an optional popular referendum at the end of the process -makes policy-making highly consensus-oriented, it also allows the parties to defend autonomous positions in parliament and to build alliances among them rather flexibly, depending on the specific policy proposal under debate. Germany, by contrast, displays a more majoritarian logic of party competition in the parliamentary realm.
Even though the government has to negotiate consensus with the opposition on certain policies and under certain circumstances (i.e. if the opposition holds the majority of seats in the Bundesrat, the federal chamber), the relation between the two main parties (Union and SPD) is much more adversarial than in Switzerland, because they compete for power in the next elections (at federal or at national level). This bipolarism implies stronger party discipline in parliament and more restricted possibilities for variable and flexible alliance formation.
The article is structured as follows: I first discuss the concept of new social needs and demands and the theoretical arguments that let me expect changes in the policy positions of the main actors. Follows a presentation of case selection and the methodological strategy.
Results on the selected cases of reforms are presented in the final chapter.
A multidimensional policy space: changing values and preferences
The cogency of the categorization of new, in contrast to old social policy issues lies at the centre of controversial debates in the literature (see, for instance, Bonoli 2003 , Taylor-Gooby 2003 , Esping-Andersen 1999 and 1999b , Huber and Stephens 2003 . In the context of increasing budgetary pressure, most of the welfare reforms during the last decades were focused on cost containment or even retrenchment (Huber and Stephens 2001) . At the same time, however, these countries are experiencing since the 1970s the transition to postindustrial social structures, characterised by the massive entry of women into the labour market, unstable family structures and growing flexibility of the labour market relations, but also by value changes according higher importance to gender equality, individualisation and free lifestyle choices. These changes create a wide range of "new" social needs for expanded welfare provision, such as infrastructure for the conciliation of work and family, improved old age insurance for employees with atypical labour contracts, etc. (Bleses and Seelaib-Kaiser 2004) . Even if no common definition of "new social risks" is agreed upon, all the abovementioned authors argue that a distinct set of social needs and risks typically appears more intensely in post-industrial economies. These welfare risks stem in the first place from changes -or failures (Esping-Andersen 1999: 145) -in family and labour market structures.
Stable family structures are eroding and gender roles are changing. Similarly, stable employment relations in the labour market are losing importance compared to interrupted employment biographies and atypical work contracts.
Hence, following a broad definition, I call modernising social policies those measures that target a problem stemming from changes in the traditional family or employment structures.
Pierson identifies three categories of welfare reforms: cost containment, re-commodification and recalibration (Pierson 2001: 419ff) . This distinction is most helpful for deriving the main goals of contemporary social policy reforms: 1) the increase of labour market participation, 2) gender equality and individualisation, 3) poverty alleviation or 4) cost containment.
Modernising social policies mainly pursue one or several of the first three goals, whereas "old" social policy reforms are mostly directed at cost containment.
The "new" politics of welfare state expansion
How do different theories of welfare policy development conceive social policy making in the era of retrenchment and post-industrialism since the beginning of the 1970s?
The most influential theoretical stream is the power resources approach. It explains the size of national welfare states by the strength of trade unions and Social Democratic parties (see e.g. Stephens 1979 , Korpi 1983 , Esping-Andersen 1990 . The welfare state is seen as a "triumph of the interests of the working class" (Baldwin 1990: 41) , policy-making being dominated by class conflict. It is argues that the power resources explanation still holds in the post-industrial era (Korpi and Palme 2003) . The context of austerity is supposed to strengthen capital at the expense of labour. The approach thus expects welfare retrenchment to the extent of the shifts in the power balance between capital and labour.
On the other hand, it has been shown that continental European welfare states are not only the result of the strength of labour, but have also been shaped by a social-conservative alliance of Social Democrats and Catholic parties (van Kersbergen 1995) . With the strengthening of capital and in the context of austerity and post-industrialism, this alliance might be expected to fail and a certain retrenchment of these welfare states would become likely.
Other studies, however, focus less on retrenchment and more on stability. They try to explain why national welfare states remain so stable Stephens 2001, Scharpf and Schmidt 1999) . Two explanations for this stability deal with the topic of this article, i.e. the evolution of coalitional dynamics:
A first explanation is given by authors of the "Varieties of capitalism"-approach. They argue that research should analyse more closely not only unions' but also employers' preferences (see e.g. Hall and Soskice 2001 , Mares 2003 , similarly Swenson 2002 and Baldwin 1990 . It is shown that sector-specific divergence within business and unions and cross-class coalitions have often been decisive in the formation of welfare states. Consequently, these authors maintain that while capital may be strengthened in the context of austerity, this does not necessarily lead to retrenchment (Hall and Soskice 2001, Manow 2001) . Several empirical studies indeed identify cross-class coalitions in favour of certain social policies (e.g. Ebbinghaus 2001 , Mares 2000 , Thelen 2000 .
The second explanation of stability in national welfare policies focuses on political parties. Huber and Stephens (2001) as well as Pierson (1996 Pierson ( , 2001 ) identified changing patterns of party preferences: programmatic differences become smaller compared to the times of welfare state expansion, because all parties have to implement some retrenchment in the "old" schemes. At the same time, however, cuts are blocked by constituencies of beneficiaries.
Hence, the new reform coalitions mainly oppose large partisan coalitions to welfare constituencies.
Drawing on this literature, I identify several theoretical arguments for the formation of new value and interest coalitions across parties, trade unions and business on new social needs and demands:
• First of all, the weakening of traditional class structure and the perspectives of a forthcoming shortage of skilled labour accentuate the blurring of the class conflict.
Employers, for instance, are supposed to become more favourable to policies increasing female labour market participation, seeing their interest coincide with claims from feminists and the left.
• Secondly, the emergence of new actors in social policy-making (Pierson 2001 ) provides opportunities for changing alliances. Since the victims of new social needs (notably young families and female workers) do not belong to the traditional clientele of parties and trade unions (Bonoli 2004 , Ebbinghaus 2003 , actors such as women's or family organisations may become more important.
• Finally, the "distributive" labour-capital-divide is further weakened by the emergence of a new "communitarian" value-cleavage between libertarian and authoritarian values (Kitschelt 1994) . Libertarians tend to privilege participation, individualisation, gender equality etc., while authoritarians remain attached to traditional family values and communitarian structures. I argue that this value-conflict not only structures the national party spaces, as Kitschelt demonstrated, but even more specifically the political space of social policy-making. Hence, coalitional dynamics would be multidimensional, displaying a "libertarian-traditionalist" value dimension in addition to the socio-economic "distributional" conflict. I argue that the new value-conflict becomes particularly relevant in policy-making on new social needs and demands, since these often aim not only at material redistribution, but also at gender equality and individualisation. In a somewhat similar vein, Bleses and Seelaib-Kaiser (2004) identify the rise of new dominant "interpretative patterns" among social policy makers in Germany, inducing a departure from the male-breadwinner model towards improved infrastructure and free choice for families. Hence, new value-alliances may differ from the traditional coalitions over welfare state building.
Hypotheses on reconfiguration of reform coalitions
For the analysis of actor configurations in decision-making processes, it must be distinguished between "issue alliances", i.e. actors with similar positions on specific elements of a reform and the actual "reform coalitions" on the whole reform packages at the end of the policy process. A reform package usually comprises several reform issues. I distinguish them, because I assume that the formation of reform coalitions is more influenced by the national institutional context of decision-making, while the positions of actors in issue-alliances derive from social and economic structural determinants.
With regard to the formation of issue alliances, I have the same hypotheses for Germany and Switzerland, since both countries are similar with regard to social and economic structural change (Oesch 2003) . Tertiarisation has increased massively but the female full time labour market participation is low. The conciliation of work and family tasks remains difficult in both countries. At the same time, both countries experience similar demographic problems, i.e. most of all a very low birth rate (less than 1,4 children per woman) (Gerlach 2004 ).
Furthermore, a shortage of skilled labour for demographic reasons has already appeared (Jaumotte 2003 , Reinberg and Hummel 2003 , Fuchs 2003 , Wanner and Ferrari 2001 The effect of a difficult economic context on alliance-formation is ambiguous. On the one hand, the "distributional" labour-capital dimension could be strengthened, which would impede alliances for increased coverage of new social needs. On the other hand, however, the reverse could happen. Indeed, Bonoli (2003: 18) points out that policies extending coverage on new social risks are generally less expensive than "old risk" schemes, not least because they are often "commodifying". Hence, even employers could strategically support them in order to build reform packages that combine expanded coverage of new social risks with restrictive elements in the old welfare schemes, i.e. political exchange for modernising compromises (Bonoli 2003: 17 and see also Pierson 2001: 427 and Weaver 2003: 35ff.) .
While the hypotheses on the formation of issue alliances are largely identical for Germany and Switzerland, I assume systematic differences with regard to reform coalitions at the end of the decisional processes. Indeed, the institutional design of the German decision-making process is less favourable to flexible coalition-building than the Swiss, because it is more majoritarian and bipolar (see above for more details). The institutional constraints in Germany require homogeneous positions of the main parties in parliament and foster polarisation between them. Therefore, even if new alliances on modernising social policies may form, I expect these alliances to break up in the latter course of the decision-making process. The actors would then realign on the "traditional" distributional left-right reform coalitions. In Switzerland, by contrast, the institutional context allows for more flexibility in the formation of issue-alliances and even reform coalitions. Therefore, I assume that in Germany, "new" and flexible modernising reform coalitions are less likely than in Switzerland.
Case selection and methods
These hypotheses are tested on the basis of four major reforms in the fields of German and Swiss pension and family policy. The reforms include "old" as well as "new" social policy issues and hence allow the comparison between the different actor constellations.
Switzerland: selected reform issues
The 10 th reform of the Swiss basic pension scheme of 1995 was aimed at introducing gender equality in a system that had formerly privileged the insurance of the male breadwinner. The element of the reform which I qualify as modernising policy, because it pursued the goals of gender equality, individualisation and poverty alleviation for new risk categories is the introduction of equal splitting of contributions and benefits between husbands and wives (combined with contribution credits for care). On the other hand, the debate on a rise in the age of retirement was largely a debate over cost containment, hence I would qualify it as old social policy issue. Finally, the reform was about the flexibilisation of the age of retirement:
This final issue cannot easily be qualified as old or new social policy demand, because it is about the distributional issue of the age of retirement, but at the same time, it is a new claim to individualise retirement.
The second reform, the law on the introduction of a maternity insurance of 1999, might seem somewhat outdated, but no such federal insurance existed in Switzerland. Hence, for
Switzerland, maternity insurance is indeed a new social demand. The governmental proposal contained firstly an income replacement insurance for women active on the labour market, financed by means of wage contributions equally split between employers and employees.
Secondly, a general tax-financed birth benefit of about 3000 Euro, granted independently of labour market participation. Finally, the bill wanted to grant similar benefits to parents in case of adoption. All three issues belong to the category of new social policy issues, since they favour working women and / or support individual lifestyle choices.
Germany: selected reform issues
The third case is the German pension reform of 1992 (RRG 1992, see also Meyer 1998 and Nullmeier/Rüb 1993 for a detailed account of this reform). Five reform issues were directed at the coverage of new social needs and demands: First, the bill proposed to extend the pension credits for educational tasks from one to three years. Moreover, these three years should newly be credited as contribution years (Beitragszeiten). Aside these measures rewarding educational tasks, the minimum pension for low wage earners was extended, improving notably the situation of female part-time employees. Fourthly, a more generous coverage of the interruption of labour market participation was included and finally, the introduction of a more flexible retirement age can also be counted among the new social policy issues. Two additional reform-elements belong to the category of old social policy issues, namely a de facto (2) increase in the formal age of retirement from 60/63 to 65 for men and women and the indexation of the pension level depending newly on net instead of gross wage increases.
Finally, the reform of the German law on educational benefits of 2000 (BEGG 2000) explicitly aimed at improving the work-care-balance and at "modernising" the German family policy (see also 
Data and methods
In analysing these reforms, I have proceeded in two steps:
In a first step, I retraced the decision-making procedures by means of secondary literature and primary sources such as governmental reports, parliamentary debates, reports on consultation procedures, etc.
In a second step -in order to systematize the rich qualitative data -I have coded the positions of the actors on four aspects of the reforms: 1) whether the actor was favourable to state intervention or not, 2) whether the social policy intervention should apply to all citizens (universal coverage) or only to parts of them, 3) whether benefits should be high or low and 4) whether the intervention should occur at the level of the federal state or at some sublevel.
For each reform-issue and for all actors, these positions have been coded on a scale from 0 to 2, 0 meaning the "least generous" policy instrument (non-intervention, low benefits, low range of insured people, etc) and 2 the "most generous" solution (universal, tax-financed, high-benefit intervention).
For the identification of actors' positions, I have relied on the responses to the official consultation procedure (Switzerland), the official statements in the public hearings before the parliamentary commission (Germany), press statements of the actors and parliamentary debates. For the few cases, for which such sources were unavailable, I used previous research (Senti 1994 , Häusermann et al. 2004 , Bonoli 1999 , Martin 2002 , Meyer 1998 and press articles.
I have then averaged the positions for each reform issue over the four aspects and analysed this data by multidimensional scaling (MDS with PROXSCAL in SPSS 11.0). This scaling method displays actors and issues spatially. The graphs should be read as follows: the distances between an actor and an issue represents the "generosity" that the actor advocates on the specific issue. An actor located closely to an issue, for example, claims extensive coverage, while more distant actors advocate restrictive positions. Hence those actors which share a similar distance towards a same issue (regardless of the distance between the actors themselves) advocate the same position on this issue and -thus -form an issue alliance.
Issue-alliances thus do not depend on the distances between the actors, but on their respective distances from an issue in the two-dimensional policy space. For an easier understanding, I
have highlighted the issue-alliances with ellipses in the graphs.
Empirical evidence on coalition reconfiguration
The empirical findings confirm my hypotheses on issue-alliances with regard to several elements of the analysed reforms.
Policy dynamics in Switzerland: fragmentation on the left and the right
The hypotheses on the formation of social-liberal, "libertarian" value alliances on reforms promoting gender equality, individualisation and female labour market participation are largely confirmed.
Pension policy
In Switzerland, the introduction of individualised splitting of contributions and benefits in the As this graph shows clearly, the combination of old and new social policy issues in a single reform package has contributed to form a two-dimensional policy space, with the potential for new reform opportunities. I hypothesized that the consensual Swiss institutional framework presents favourable conditions, so that these opportunities could actually lead to new reform coalitions. Indeed, we observe a de-alignment of distributional left-right coalitions in the pension reform. The reform package, combining "old" and "new" social policy issues was in fact strategically tied up by the right wing actors (Häusermann et al. 2000 , Bonoli 2001 ).
Indeed, it deeply divided the left into a "trade unionist wing" making the opposition against the retirement issue their top priority and a "partisan" left according more weight to social modernisation, i.e. splitting. Hence, the Social Democrats and the Green Party supported the entire package at the end of the negotiation process, while the unions rejected it. The reformcoalitions then formed as follows:
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE This reform shows that the introduction of a value-dimension in the reform -in addition to the distributional dimension -led to a reconfiguration of issue-alliances and reform-coalitions.
Family policy
The multidimensionality of the policy space is less plain to see in the case of the federal maternity insurance, because all issues at stake were new social policies. Hence, I expected a social-liberal coalition, as well as employers' support for those measures enabling female labour market participation.
On the issue of income insurance, almost all actors agreed that this risk should be covered.
Heavy opposition against the governmental proposal came, however, from the employers' associations (SGV, SAV) and -to a minor extent -from the Free Democratic Party (FDP), the conservative Swiss People's Party (SVP) and the Liberal Party who argued that having children was a private, not a public affair. The opposition of the employers against the maternity insurance contradicts my hypothesis, according to which the employers would be interested in measures favouring female labour market participation. However, their opposition was not as profound: their main argument against federal maternity insurance was that this risk was already covered at the level of industries (collective agreements) and firms, and that it must not be financed with additional wage contributions. Hence, they rejected the income insurance because of the mode of financing, but did not oppose the actual coverage of the risk as such.
On the issue of birth benefits, a similar configuration could be observed. While almost all
parties as well as the trade unions supported the birth benefits, the employers (mainly the SAV, but also the more conservative SGV) strongly rejected this part of the bill proposal. This is easily explained, since this policy instrument does not contribute to the enabling of labour market participation, but is rather a recognition of motherhood as such as a socially valuable task. On the issue of granting adoptive parents the same benefits, liberal, conservative and left-wing actors alike claimed that the issue should not be mixed up with income insurance. There was an overall consensus on the rejection of this reform element in this reform.
Hence, on this bill proposal, conflict lines were blurred and the main debate was about the organisation and the financing of the new income insurance scheme. Accordingly, the MDS shows no clear "camps" but interesting differences with regard to different modernising issues (for interpretation guidelines, see end of paragraph 3.3).
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
The graph shows a large number of actors close to the issues of income insurance and birth benefits (single ellipse) and the employers (SAV, SGV) and some right-wing actors (EDU, LPS) in a larger distance. Hence, an overall consensus on the coverage of income insurance and birth benefits can be observed with regard to the acceptance of coverage. We see, however, also, that while the Social Democratic and the Labour Party (SPS and PDA) were equally favourable to birth benefits and to income insurance, the more conservative actors (SVP, BSV, FDP) are clearly closer to the birth benefits than to income insurance, which would favour female labour market participation. Nevertheless, the main result from this scaling is the absence of a clear conflict line between the "distributional" left and right.
Rather, left and right parties, as well as trade unions are very close, with only the employers in opposition.
As hypothesized with regard to the Swiss institutional framework, this led to unusual conflict 
Policy dynamics in Germany: selective alliance formation by the government Pension policy
The governmental bill proposal on the German pension reform of 1992 came in parliament already as a compromise between the governing FDP/CDU/CSU and the opposition (SPD).
However, as in the 10 th reform of the Swiss basic pension scheme, the German Social Democrats only reluctantly consented to this reform and only agreed because of the "modernising" elements on gender equality. Consequently, the reform led to a certain
fragmentation of the left between the Social Democratic Party and the trade unions:
In fact, for the SPD, the extended coverage of new social needs (educational benefits, contribution credits, flexibilisation) was so important that they even accepted an increase in the age of retirement and the net wage indexation of pensions. The trade unions (DGB, DBB, DAG) and the Greens also advocated increased protection of educational tasks, but accorded more weight to the distributional issues of retirement age and pension indexation. Hence, the trade unions largely turned the overall bill proposal down, even if they principally agreed with the modernising elements. The employers (BDA, ZDH, ULA), on the other hand, were rather indifferent towards the modernising elements, but they strongly claimed an increase in the age of retirement and net wage indexation. Hence, CDU/CSU and FDP made concessions to the SPD in terms of new social policy instruments to impose restrictive reforms on the age of retirement and pension indexation. The following graph displays this actor constellation (see end of paragraph 3.3. for interpretation guidelines):
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE One can clearly identify the "middle" block of trade unions (DAG, DBB, DAG) and the Green Party almost equally close to the increase in the age of retirement and the coverage of educational tasks, which means that they advocated "generous" policies for both issues. The SPD, however, is situated more clearly near the new social policy issues. As for the block of employers in the lower left corner, their main claim was for an increase in the age of retirement and net wage indexation (large distance from these issues, together with the CDU/CSU and FDP, ellipse on the left). In addition, we see the agreement of SPD, FDP, CDU/CSU and the unions on the issues of flexibilisation, educational benefits and the increase of minimum pensions (upper ellipse).
To underline the importance of the social-liberal value coalition that was able to build the reform package, let me point to a common claim raised by the FDP and SPD. Both partiestogether with the Greens -demanded a complete splitting of contributions and benefits in the old age insurance between husband and wife. In addition, both claimed educational benefits not only to inactive, but also to working mothers mothers. The CDU/CSU, however, opposed these claims on the basis of a more conservative idea of family structure. That the benefits were only targeted at women inactive on the labour market may also explain the absence of employers' support. In sum, we observe again that the issues related to gender equality and Despite these unusual and flexible alliances on specific issues, the final reform coalitions nevertheless resembled the "traditional" left-right-conflict. Indeed, even though the conservative parties (CDU/CSU and FDP) had consented to the propositions of increasing educational benefit and more generous parental leave, the final vote in parliament clearly opposed them to the left-wing governmental parties (SPD/Greens) without any party fragmentation. Similarly, the trade unions were favourable to the reform, whereas the employers rejected it, even though they had agreed on the incentives for a rapid return of parents to the labour market. This case thus largely confirms the hypothesis that a rather adversarial institutional context of decision-making tends to realign "new" issue-alliances along traditional conflict lines.
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
We still have to explain the anomaly that the SPD was co-opted in the reform coalition adopting the pension reform bill of 1992, despite the bi-polar party competition in the German institutional framework. This difference to the reform coalitions in the law on educational benefits is all the more puzzling when we consider that in 1989, when the pension reform was voted, the conservative government (CDU/CSU/FDP) held a (slight) majority in both chambers of the German parliament. Instead, in 2000, the SPD/Green government faced a conservative majority in the Bundesrat, which would have made a broad reform coalition in the parental leave reform even more plausible. How can the consent of the SPD to the pension reform be explained? First, there existed an informal "tradition" of consensual pension reforms until the 1990s (Nullmeier and Rüb 1993) . The idea was that the pension system was of such importance that it should not be exposed to the influence of changing political majorities. This "tradition", however, came to an end already in 1997, when the SPD heavily opposed the conservative reform. The second argument, then, is linked to this growing overall polarisation in the 1990s. With the increasing budgetary pressure, a fundamental opposition between the major parties intensified (even though this antagonism was sometimes rather rhetoric, see Pierson 2001, Huber and Stephens 2001) and political exchange became more difficult.
Conclusion
In this article, I argued that reform elements covering new social needs and demands would lead to the formation of new alliances in reform processes, which transform the space of social policy making from one-into two-dimensional, adding a value-axis to the traditional distributional conflict line. This hypothesis could be largely confirmed by means of the analysis of four reform processes in Switzerland and Germany. Modernising value coalitions could be observed between Social Democratic, liberal and sometimes even conservative parties on reform-issues such as the splitting of pension contribution benefits for husbands and wives, birth benefits, pension contribution credits for carers and the flexibilisation of parental leave organisation. Cross-class alliances between the left and employers were more rare, but occurred on the splitting of pension contributions, better pension protection against discontinuous employment biographies and on financial incentives to combine parental leave and part-time employment. On the other hand, the traditional left-right distributional conflicts could mainly be observed with respect to "old" social policy issues such as the age of retirement and the mode of pension indexation. Interestingly, for the social partners, these "old" issues remain primordial, while the parties are more sensitive to new social policy issues.
These coalitional realignments tended to lead to strong intra-party fragmentation on the left and the right in Switzerland, while party discipline in the votes on the final reform packages remained generally higher in the more adversarial German system. 
